

15 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Public Affairs Advisory Group
FROM: Herbert E. Hetu, Chairman
SUBJECT: Minutes of 11 December 1978 Meeting

1. The Minutes of the December 1978 meeting of the Public Affairs Advisory Group (PAAG) are attached for your information.

2. The PAAG will meet next at 1000 hours on Tuesday, 23 January 79, in the DCI Conference Room. If you are unable to attend, please notify [redacted] (351-7676) of the name of your alternate. A proposed agenda for the next meeting will be distributed separately.

Herbert E. Hetu

Attachment
Minutes

Distribution:
Charles Briggs, OIG

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Minutes of the
Public Affairs Advisory Group
11 December 1978

Attending: OPA - Herbert Hetu, Chairman
OIG - Charles Briggs

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Absent: OGC -
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Minutes

1. Introductory Remarks/Announcements/Reports

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The Chairman announced the Director's luncheon for five newspeople that day and his upcoming breakfast with the NBC bureau (12-18 people) on 14 December. He reviewed the DCI's activities on his 29-30 November trip to Boston and the schedule for the upcoming Intelligence Community Public Affairs Officers meeting [] on 13 December.

The Chairman also announced the DCI's proposed meetings with employees in the auditorium have been tabled until he gets back from his overseas trip in late January. The subject probably will not be brought up again unless the PAAG so recommends. Mr. Hetu's view is that, if the idea is revived, the meetings should be open Agency-wide on a first come-first served basis (not by directorate as originally suggested) and that topical subjects -- such as intelligence on Iran --should be discussed briefly, followed by a question-and-answer session. The PAAG expressed no view of the proposed meetings.

In response to subjects discussed at the 9 November PAAG meeting, an item on the PAAG appeared in the 28 November Notes From the Director, and the next meeting agenda and list of members were posted on the Public Affairs bulletin board.

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Also as a follow-on to the 9 November meeting, a proposed DCI letterhead was shown to the group--a blue banner with ICS seal and "Director of Central Intelligence" in large letters--for possible use on Public Affairs handouts. The validity of using the ICS seal was questioned and it was suggested that "Office of the Director of Central Intelligence" would be sufficient. In response to the question of why it was needed at all, [redacted] explained that some of the handouts we have will be useful to the RM and CT Staffs and to other IC agencies if they are not on CIA letterhead. The Chairman said we would try to have another proposal ready by the next meeting.

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A proposed new handout on the Intelligence Cycle was passed to the group for comment and it was explained that it will be used in response to an enormous number of requests to define this process.

[redacted] requested that "analysis" appear more prominently in the production step of the cycle. [redacted] expressed his reluctance to alter an Agency and Community-approved definition, but agreed with Mr. Hetu to try to find a suitable solution that would incorporate this request.

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Copies of the DDCI's address to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, California on 15 November and the DCI's remarks to the JFK School of Government at Harvard on 30 November were distributed for information. The Question & Answer Book with talking points prepared by Public Affairs for the DCI and DDCI's review prior to speaking engagements or public meetings was passed around for information. The Chairman noted that a similar book was envisioned to be part of Public Affairs eventual support to members of the Speakers Bureau which is under construction.

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Also passed around the table were the stock still-photo albums that resulted from a contract with former employee [redacted]. [redacted] Photos include a variety of scenes of the Headquarters building inside and out which may be used internally in publications such as the DCI's Annual Report and externally in response to requests from newpeople for pictures to accompany stories.

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2. DCI's Article for Foreign Affairs, "Protecting Secrets in a Free Society"

[redacted] said the article was circulated for comment by Ben Evans and is currently being redone by [redacted] as a result. There was discussion as to whether the article was appropriate for Foreign Affairs, which has a limited audience that is already enlightened regarding the theme, and because a similar article appeared in it less than a year ago. The Chairman agreed with the suggestion that the PAAG should review the article once it has been redone.

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3. CCTV

The Chairman recommended a written recommendation be sent to DDA regarding the future of CCTV.

A sampling of opinion regarding TV's in the cafeteria has proven to be negative. [redacted] suggested that the PAAG attack the problem from a positive side; that the objective, once defined, would suggest the placement of the TV sets. The Chairman said the original reason for the TV's was to accommodate overflow in the auditorium and to rebroadcast commercial shows of interest to the Agency. He emphasized his concern that the system be effectively used, either where they are now or elsewhere, such as in classrooms.

The means for the Agency to communicate internally with its own employees was discussed as a possible alternative use of the CCTV.

Members of the PAAG were asked to solicit ideas from their component organizations.

4. Speakers Bureau

The Chairman noted that the progress of the Bureau has been delayed for the lack of a full time Director and because of such problems as the support speakers would need from OPA and a decision as to who pays for travel. The Chairman also noted that a recent PMCD survey recommended that OTR's briefing billet be transferred to OPA and several members expressed agreement with the recommendation.

5. Goals

Mr. Hetu reported on the status of several goal-related projects:

Multi-media show - Contract has been let and we met with the designer and writer last Friday. Target date for completion: 1 May 79

One-day Media Seminar at Headquarters - Cancelled because of negative reaction to the idea both from within and from respected members of the media.

Strengthen the Publications Review Board Procedures - Need an updated Agency regulation on the process, but it is currently working well. In response to a question, [redacted] said that the PRB in recent months has been able to stay within the 30 days allowed for review.

Brochure - Considerable text has been written and Suzanne Black is working with an Agency designer on composition and layout. We hope to have something to show the PAAG by January.

6. Purpose of PAAG

There was a request for clarification of the purpose of the PAAG and what is expected of its members. It was suggested that members be given items to consider in advance of meetings so that they would have full opportunity to play "advisory" roles. The Chairman said that the point is well taken, that he is not only looking for advice from the PAAG but for feedback as well, in an effort to try to overcome misconceptions about what OPA is trying to do.

7. University Student Group Visits to Headquarters

STAT [redacted] distributed for information a memorandum dated 28 November 78, which he had sent to D/OS recommending reconsideration of the policy of limiting student groups to the auditorium and excluding non-US students from the compound. [redacted] said these restrictions seriously hamper the mission of his office.

STAT Mr. Briggs suggested that public image be focused on the intelligence world, rather than CIA specifically, and to overcome problems such as space and security, other buildings such as those in the [redacted] complex be considered for meetings of both external and internal groups, task forces, etc.

STAT 8. [redacted] announced that the DDCI was to testify before the House Assassinations Committee that day at 1400.

9. The Chairman closed the meeting by asking for members inputs to future agendas.

STAT APPROVED: [redacted]

Herbert E. Hetu, Chairman

Respectfully submitted: [redacted] /

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence is knowledge and fore-knowledge of the world around us—the prelude to Presidential decision and action.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Phone: (703) 351-7676

The Intelligence Cycle

is the process by which information is acquired, converted into intelligence, and made available to policymakers. There are usually five steps which constitute *The Intelligence Cycle*.

1. Planning and Direction

This involves the management of the entire intelligence effort, from the identification of the need for data to the final delivery of an intelligence product to a customer.

The whole process is initiated by requests or requirements for intelligence on certain subjects. These are based on the ultimate needs of the policymakers—the President, the National Security Council, and other major departments and agencies of government.

2. Collection

This involves the gathering of the raw data from which finished intelligence will be produced. There are many sources for the collection of information, including foreign radiobroadcasts, newspapers, periodicals, and official government personnel stationed in American embassies abroad.

There are also secret sources, such as agents and defectors who provide information obtainable in no other way.

Finally, technical collection—photography and electronics—has come to play an indispensable part in modern intelligence by extending the Nation's sensory system—its eyes and ears.

3. Processing

This step is concerned with the conversion of the vast amount of information coming into the system to a form more suitable for the production of finished intelligence, such as in language translations, decryption, and sorting by subject matter. The information that does not go directly to analysts is sorted and made available for rapid computer retrieval.

Processing also refers to data reduction—interpretation of the information stored on film and tape through the use of highly refined photographic and electronic processes.

4. Production and Analysis

This refers to the conversion of basic information into finished intelligence. It includes the integration, evaluation, and analysis of all available data and the preparation of a variety of intelligence products. Such products or estimates may be presented as briefings, brief reports or lengthy studies.

The "raw intelligence" collected is frequently fragmentary and at times contradictory. Analysts, who are subject-matter specialists for a particular country, produce finished intelligence by evaluating and integrating the various pieces of data and interpreting their meaning and significance.

The subjects involved may concern different regions, problems, or personalities in various contexts—political, geographic, economic, military, scientific, or biographic. Current events, capabilities, or probable developments in the future may also be examined.

5. Dissemination

The last step is the distribution and handling of the finished intelligence to the consumers of intelligence, the same policymakers whose needs triggered the Intelligence Cycle.

Sound policy decisions must be based on sound knowledge. Intelligence aims to provide that knowledge.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Phone: (703) 351-7676

MEMORANDUM FOR: PAAG Members

For discussion at next PAAG meeting. See
Item 1, para. 4 of Minutes of 11 Dec
Meeting.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

NFAC #5339/78

28 November 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert W. Gambino, Director of Security
THROUGH : Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
FROM : Coordinator for Academic Relations, NFAC
SUBJECT : New Security Regulations on University Student Group
Visits to Headquarters

1. It has come to the attention of this office that over the past several weeks there has been a change in security policy on two aspects of university student group visits to the Headquarters Building. These changes are:

- a. Limiting student and faculty visitors to the Auditorium.
- b. Excluding any foreign national student attending a US institution of learning from entering the compound.

These restrictions are severely limiting our ability to run a successful program.

2. Background: When the job of Coordinator for Academic Relations and External Analytical Support (and later that of Associate Coordinator) was created as a full-time position, its charter included an effort to change the image of CIA in the academic community. As part of this effort, a program of Headquarters visits and briefings of university student groups was undertaken. These visits usually consist of an unclassified briefing on the CIA, especially on NFAC and its functions of supporting US policymakers. Sometimes, discussions on functional or regional problems are added.

3. Our program has centered on graduate and undergraduate schools with strong programs in area studies and foreign affairs or schools that run courses on national security problems. In the past two years, NFAC

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has hosted 24 university student and faculty groups from Syracuse University (the Maxwell School), Columbia University (the International Fellows Program), West Point, the University of California, Princeton University, Illinois Wesleyan University, Colgate University, and the University of Michigan. These groups have ranged in size from ten to 150 people. Often they included a few foreign nationals.

4. At the 26 October 1978 meeting of university presidents with Admiral Turner, the visitors pointed out that student visits to the Agency are a major way of improving the Agency's image with the student body. The university presidents suggested that this program be expanded. The program also has had positive aspects besides the obvious public relations effects. For example, the program has aided in establishing good personal relationships with faculty members on many campuses. These contacts are useful in recruiting employees and consultants. In addition, many of the students and some faculty members who visit become interested in employment by the Agency. Further, some students who visit us will find employment at the State Department, the Department of Defense or the Treasury, where they will begin with an awareness of the resources available from the Agency and will be more inclined to coordinate their work efforts with Agency analysts.

5. The Problem: The restriction that limits all student groups to the Auditorium during working hours severely limits our ability to run a successful briefing program. First, there are the physical problems. The Auditorium is often booked when student groups would like to visit the Agency. Many of these groups are from out of town and are planning a Washington visit for only a day or two. Their flexibility in time and date of visit is limited and with only the Auditorium, so is ours. For example, recently a small group of honors students from the University of Michigan were planning to visit Washington for one day only, 27 November. They requested a series of area briefings similar to those received by the same group last year. We had to turn them down because the Auditorium had been booked all day for a series of security briefings.

6. On occasion we have had several groups requesting visits on the same day and even at the same time of day. If we are limited to the use of the Auditorium, we can only accommodate one group at a time. As a

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case in point, we are scheduled again this year to host the language clubs from the US Military Academy at West Point in April, 1979. These clubs, of which there are usually at least three, have about 40 members each. In the past they have been given individual area briefings; for example, a Soviet area briefing for the Russian language club and a Middle East situation briefing for the Arabic club. Obviously it will not be feasible to do this, unless we have three or four separate rooms to meet in.

7. There are also certain valuable intangibles such as the atmosphere of intimacy a briefing creates. This is hardly achievable, however, if we are forced to brief 20 students in an auditorium that holds 500. A small conference room would serve much better. In addition, we are told that the trip to the Agency is often the highlight of a student group's trip to Washington. Many of our visitors are greatly impressed with our facilities and go away with the feeling that they have seen something few others have seen.

8. The second change in security procedure, that of excluding foreign students from participating in Agency visits, will probably have an even more damaging impact upon our program. We naturally seek to attract graduate students involved in area study programs or foreign affairs curriculum at major universities. These types of programs from major universities usually attract a number of foreign students for obvious reasons. At present, there are over 235,000 foreign students registered in colleges and universities throughout the US. It is very difficult to tell a program administrator or faculty member that he can bring forty of his students into the compound but must not bring his two non-US students. In discussions with university officials on this matter, I have encountered resentment and a general lack of understanding. The reaction usually is to question what a few well-mannered non-US students could possibly do to the Agency, which has a security force capable of coping with TV and movie cameras shooting in the building.

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**SUBJECT: New Security Regulations on University Student Group
Visits to Headquarters**

9. Recommendation: That the policy of (a) limiting student groups to the Auditorium and (b) excluding non-US students from the compound be reconsidered.

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NFAC #5339/78

**SUBJECT: New Security Regulations on University Student Group
Visits to Headquarters**

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STAT NFAC/ACAR [] js (28 November 1978)

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

Deputy Director Frank D. Carlucci

Address — The Commonwealth Club

San Francisco, California

Wednesday, November 15, 1978

AMBASSADOR SHIRLEY TEMPLE BLACK: ...the Congo, Tanzania and Brazil, where he was Counselor for Political Affairs. Returning to Washington in 1969, he served two years with the Office of Economic Opportunity, one year with the Office of Management and Budget as Deputy Director, and two years with Health, Education and Welfare as Undersecretary. In 1974, he returned to overseas service as U. S. Ambassador to Portugal during the turbulent times when socialism and communism were locked in their own wrestling match over Portugal.

Our guest has received Distinguished Service awards from three departments -- State, HEW and Defense; an honorary doctorate from two universities. Not only is he a distinguished public servant and wrestler, he also served briefly as an officer in the U. S. Navy, which would provide a bond of professional interest with both the Director of the CIA and the President.

We are delighted to welcome a gentleman that's got very serious and profoundly important responsibilities. Ladies and gentlemen, may I present to you the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Frank C. Carlucci.

[Applause.]

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: Thank you very much, Ambassador Black, President Javits. After that introduction, I'm not sure whether I should give you a speech or wrestle. I will try the former.

As I thought about the topic of the real issues facing the CIA, a plethora of subjects lept to mind. And I tried to distill them down to essentially four. Well, let me give them to you directly and then go over them.

Number one, the nature of the external threat. Number two, the challenge of the changing nature of the intelligence business. Number three, the imperative to define the role of a secret organization in a free society. And number four, our

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ability or inability, as it may be, to protect our vital information; in particular, our sources and methods. Let me look at these one at a time.

In terms of the nature of the external threat, I suppose there were some of us in the early 1970s who were thinking in terms of the changing adversary, a new kind of world order, a different kind of relationship between the big powers. And indeed, it is fair to say that all of us hoped that this will come about. But there have been two events, at least, that have occurred in the mid and late 1970s which have certainly at least raised warning signs. First are the rather extensive and blatantly imperialistic activities of the Soviet Union and its Cuban proxy in Africa. This has reminded us all too clearly that communist doctrine is a revolutionary doctrine and that it is directed at the kind of free society that we represent. I had an opportunity to observe this at firsthand in 1975 in Portugal.

Secondly, we have all watched the increasing resources being devoted by the Soviet Union to its defense establishment, or, better stated, its offensive establishment. The United States devotes somewhere between five and a half to six percent of its GNP to defense expenditures. The Soviet Union devotes more than double that. In the past ten years, U. S. defense expenditure has actually declined in real terms. The Soviets' defense expenditure has increased at a rate of about four or five percent per annum.

If we try to measure what they are doing in terms of dollar value, that is how many dollars does it take to purchase what they are doing in defense areas, we find that their effort exceeds ours by some thirty-five to forty percent, certainly far more than they need for their legitimate defense requirements.

Well, what does this mean in the intelligence area? It means, first of all, that we have reached an era of strategic parity. The United States no longer has a vast lead. Simply stated, that means we can't afford to make any mistakes. A couple of years back, missing out on some information on some new alliance might not have made a difference. But today it could make a difference both in political and military terms.

That is why we find our military commanders increasingly placing more emphasis on intelligence, on what they call strategic warning. Those few hours, those few days could make the critical difference. An obscure troop movement somewhere, the movement of some atomic weapons, the deployment of submarines, maybe a report picked up by a strategically placed agent could reveal some intent or some kind of new alliance.

Indeed, intelligence today could provide the critical difference. And that, I suggest, is very real. We learned the lesson awfully painfully in 1941 at the time of Pearl Harbor. And

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it was for that reason that the CIA was created.

Now since then, the nature of the intelligence business has changed rather dramatically. And this brings me to my second issue: the challenge that that change represents. Certainly we still have to keep an eye on the strategic balance, and we have to watch what the Warsaw Pact is doing. But that's not enough in a complex, intriguing world. We also have to keep our eye on regional and issue-oriented problems. A couple of years back, it was enough just to take a look at one country and analyze that country and say "Where is it heading?" That kind of analysis no longer serves us very well.

Just take a look, for example, at the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia and what's happening in the Ogaden and in Eritrea. But you can't look at that in isolation. You have to look at what's happening in Somalia, how does it affect the Sudan; what about Egypt, what about the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen right across the Gulf; how does the Cuban presence in Ethiopia relate to the Cuban presence in Mozambique; what does this all mean for Angola. Indeed, you could make an analysis that would stretch all the way from Zimbabwe up to Afghanistan.

So it's become much more complicated to look at nations today. And it no longer serves just to have one country as your specialty.

Secondly, we have to deal with a lot of issues today that we didn't have to, things that were never dreamed of at the time CIA was founded. Let's take the intention of some countries to build nuclear weapons, a matter of intense concern to the administration. And there are countries in the world that are doing that, and they're doing it without trying to let anybody know about it. And in many instances, it is only through intelligence that we can find out.

Of course, nobody in his right mind would think of having a SALT treaty if we didn't have the means to implement it. And that means will have to fall principally to our intelligence agencies. Even such issues as the North-South dialogues have have national security implications these days. And then we have a couple of others that sometimes touch us in very personal ways. The question of narcotics. The best way to stop the narcotics trade is to stop it abroad. A lot of that information comes clandestinely through intelligence.

Or terrorism. Practically the only way to stop terrorism is to find out about it in advance, to have a penetration. Fortunately, we've been spared a lot of that in this country. But there is still a danger to our people abroad. And we in the intelligence business do try to penetrate terrorist groups, sometimes successfully, sometimes not so successfully.

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And finally, there are the resource issues. Whoever thought at the time that Central Intelligence was being set up that we would be worried so much about the world's oil reserves and what's going to happen. And whether or not you agree with the study that's been put out on this subject, I think you have to agree that we made these studies in the interests of our national security. And this requires very careful intelligence collection.

Finally, there are the new techniques. And a lot has been made about the technical systems, and indeed these systems will be extremely helpful; indeed essential to verifying SALT. Some people have said to me, "Well, you have the technical systems. Why do you need the human element?" A very simple answer. The technical system will tell you what happened yesterday and what may even be happening today. But it can't tell you what's going to happen tomorrow. It can't tell you what people's intent is. And as long as we need to know the intentions, there will continue to be a human element in the collection business.

Now, CIA for a number of years has been on the front pages of your newspapers. There's been a lot more written than we would like to see. It's not been the best climate in which to conduct an intelligence operation. Some of the charges have been sensationalist; others have been factual. But they have led to what I believe is, by and large, a constructive debate. And that is a debate on what the role of a secret agency in a free society ought to be.

But let's try and put, first of all, some of the charges into perspective without making any effort to defend against all of the charges that have been made. But there is an impression among some that the CIA intelligence community is some kind of a rogue elephant on the loose. And let me just quote a few things. The Church Committee itself, which conducted a far-reaching and, I think it's fair to say, not terribly friendly investigation of the CIA, said [words unintelligible]. The Pike Committee, on the House side, said, and I quote: "All evidence suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control, has been utterly responsive to instructions of the President and the assistants for national security."

Senator Inouye, the highly respected chairman of the first Senate oversight committee, put it even more strongly. He said, and I quote: "There's no question that a number of abuses of power, mistakes in judgment and failures by the intelligence agency have harmed the United States. In almost every instance, the abuses that have been reviewed were the results of directions from above, including Presidents and secretaries of State. Further, in almost every instance, some members of both houses of Congress assigned to give oversight were knowledgeable about the activity."

And to blame the CIA for implementing some of these poli-

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cies is somewhat akin to blaming the Army for the landing in the Dominican Republic, blaming Marines for the landing in Lebanon in the mid 1950s. It was an organization that was carrying out orders.

But be that as it may, I'm prepared to concede the point that we have a credibility problem, or a political problem, or both. And the best way to correct that problem is to reassure the American people that a proper set of checks and balances have been instituted, that the abuses that occurred in the past will not re-occur.

And I think I can tell you in all candor that these checks and balances do exist. And the Director and I practice very much an open door policy. If people have dissents or grievances, we're readily available. And the internal inspection system has been strengthened, and it has a full mandate to look into any charges.

Over and above that, the President has established by Executive Order something called the Intelligence Oversight Board, consisting of three distinguished Americans -- Tom Farmer, former Governor Scranton, former Senator Gore -- which is entirely independent of the CIA. It reports directly to the President, and it is empowered to hear any complaint of wrongdoing from any citizen, anywhere, including CIA employees, without any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence.

And finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is congressional oversight. The congressional oversight system has been greatly strengthened in the past two years, both on the Senate and the House side. I think we have constructive relationships with our parent committees. But that doesn't mean that they don't hesitate to criticize us, or to cut off our funds when they think we're doing something they don't approve of. But this kind of constructive oversight is welcomed.

Finally, we are in favor of seeking charter legislation for the intelligence community. We think this kind of endorsement by the people's representatives in Congress will be helpful. But we also think that charter legislation ought to be just that: broad legislation that gives us certain authorities and sets up procedures to make sure there are no abuses of these authorities. It should not be a form of micro management. And there are difficult issues here. Some people say we ought to write into the charter that we shouldn't overthrow democratic governments, and there shouldn't be any relationship with the press, all of which sounds fine until you get down to the question of trying to define what a democratic government is. Or when you think about the press, does that mean that the CIA shouldn't have a relationship with a TASS correspondent? Oh, of course not. He's a communist. How about some other countries that we may not like, but aren't communist? The question

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gets quite complex. When you start trying to legislate morality, it becomes very difficult.

Let's take a look at terrorism. I mentioned earlier that the best way to stop terrorism is to penetrate it. And in several instances we've received information that has saved lives, including lives of U. S. Ambassadors. But what do we do when our agent in a terrorist group is ordered to go on a hit, or maybe a bank robbery? Well, obviously, you don't authorize him to go out and kill. But if we tell him not to, his life is then in danger. A difficult judgment to make; and even more difficult to make in legislation.

I would suggest that the best way is through the normal procedures, and that is to have Congress confirm in office executives in whom they will have the confidence to make the difficult kind of judgment calls, and then to exercise the proper oversight.

Now in coming to this, we have gotten ourselves into situations where the micro management doesn't seem to make much sense. You have a requirement, for example, that every time that the CIA engages in anything other than pure intelligence collection, something euphemistically called special activity -- it used to be called a covert action -- there has to be a presidential finding and we have to brief seven committees of Congress, up to 140 people. It sounds fine, until the other day, during the Moro kidnaping, we received a request for assistance from the Italian government. They said "Could you send us a psychiatrist who knows something about terrorism?" I said sure. The lawyer came in and said "Huh-huh, that's not intelligence collection. That's a specialized case. And to do that, you'll have to get a presidential finding." The President happened to have been visiting Brazil at that point. "And then you'll have to brief these committees of Congress, 104 congressmen." I said "What? To put a psychiatrist on an airplane?" The answer was yes.

I called up the State Department and said "Do you have a psychiatrist?" He said yes. I said "Will you please put him on an airplane and send him to Rome?" That was that. But it just doesn't make much sense.

Or let me give you a hypothetical example. Let's say we have a democratic election in country "X." And a group of generals begin to wonder about that election. They don't like the candidates for election. And we have an agent in that country who happens to be a general. And he comes to us and says "What should I do? Should I side with the generals, or should I say 'Go pull off a coup?'" Well, if I understand the law, before we give him advice, we would have to have a presidential finding and brief nearly a dozen committees of Congress. And how long do you think the name of that general will remain a secret? Obviously

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we're not going to give him advice.

And I simply put these kinds of issues out as the type of thing that can be addressed and, I hope, simplified in charter legislation.

My last issue, our ability to protect our sources and methods, is probably the most fundamental of all. No matter how sincere people are, it is simply axiomatic that the more people know about something, the greater is the likelihood that it will become public. And frankly, too many people know about what is going on in our intelligence community today. And in fact, there are those who make a career out of trying to expose the names of CIA employees. There's a former CIA employee named Philip Agee who prints in DuPont Circle, in Washington, D. C., a monthly publication called "Covert Action," which is designed, purely and simply to expose the names of CIA people overseas and does so in such a way that it clearly incites people to violence. And we have some unhappy memories of that kind of thing.

Yet when we look at ways to deal with this, we find that we antequated espionage laws. We have laws in this country that make it a crime just to give out information from the Department of Agriculture on crop futures, or to give out information from the Department of Commerce, or information from the IRS. But there is no such law with regard to national security. It is only a crime if you can prove intent to harm the United States, which is very difficult to do.

So it's no wonder that we have people who come into the CIA, spend some time, go out and write a book, make some money. And we find that our only legal remedy right now is a civil suit; hardly adequate if we're going to maintain the integrity of our intelligence secrets.

And in fact, some of our laws wouldn't seem to help. I mentioned Philip Agee before. Under the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act, we have three people in the CIA, at least at the last count I made, who are spending fulltime supplying information to Mr. Agee.

Now in terms of making information available to the public, we favor it. And I think Admiral Turner spoke to this group about it last year. Our agency puts out some hundred and fifty finished reports on serious topics, such as economic developments in the Soviet Union, the steel industry in China, world oil reserves. I think that serves a useful purpose, and we intend to continue that. But at the same time, we find that we have diverted 109 man years to answering 85 Freedom of Information Act requests a week; people writing in saying "Tell me all about the Berlin Tunnel," one of whom was a 13 year old. It's not that I see anything wrong with the Freedom of Information Act. But when it comes

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to an intelligence agency, it is virtually self-defeating. We spend 2.6 million dollars supplying this information, at approximately \$540.00 per request, most of which goes to taking out the national security information. So when the product emerges, it amounts to very little, except that it's been helpful to one or two authors.

Also as I understand the act, if the head of the KGB were to write and say "Tell us about the KGB, what you have in your files on the KGB," we would legally have to respond in ten days. And if we turned down his request on security grounds, he would have twenty days in which we have to respond -- we would have twenty days to respond to his appeal.

Now, I suggest that we don't want to turn an agency designed to provide our policy-makers with the best possible information to the purveyor of information to the world.

I can say that this is a matter of very serious concern for us. The issue is very simple. Do we need an intelligence organization? The answer is, yes. Then you have to accept the fact that with that organization comes some secrecy. And secrecy is not a new concept in our society. When we talk about the doctor-patient relationship, the lawyer-client relationship, the secrecy of grand juries, credit information, why should someone who provides information to the U. S. government be entitled to less than that? Indeed, I find myself in agreement with our friends in the press when they say they've got to protect their sources, because if they can't protect their sources, they're going to lose information. That's exactly our point.

A couple of differences. Their stand is based on a constitutional interpretation which is still open to dispute. Our responsibility to protect our sources is very specific in the 1947 National Security Act. And in most cases, if they lose their sources, they lose information. Quite frankly, in some cases if we lose our sources, lives are at stake. So I think it is a very serious issue.

I'm frequently asked, well, how do we stand? How do we do vis-a-vis the adversary? And let me close on this note. The KGB has more resources than we have. They have fewer restraints than we have. They operate with a pretty few hand. They also have disadvantages. Technically, we're ahead. And they carry around an awful lot of ideological baggage. And the worst way to deal with intelligence is from an ideological perspective. In many cases, intelligence is bad news. And I would not like to be the bearer of bad news to the Kremlin.

The fact is that our analytical capability is, in my judgment, far superior to theirs. Yes, I still think we're number one, and we need to be number one. But we're going to have

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to run to stay ahead. We're going to have to work hard. We're going to make progress, and to make that progress we're going to need the support of groups such as this.

And I thank you very much for the opportunity to let me make my speech here tonight.

Thank you.

Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
JFK School of Government
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Thursday, 30 November 1978

IS THE CIA ACCOUNTABLE?

I am very pleased to be back at Harvard and to share with you some of the significant new trends that I see in the intelligence process of our country today. There are few public institutions in history that have undergone such thorough public scrutiny as has the American intelligence community in the last four years, particularly, the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA is and should be our most secretive government agency. The fact that it has undergone this public scrutiny is really extraordinary. Perhaps it is the first time the world has had opened up to it a major intelligence organization in almost all of its aspects. It has been a traumatic experience for those of us in the intelligence community. It has damaged morale. The typical intelligence officer, for instance, feels that he is performing a difficult, patriotic task which requires great sacrifice on his part. When he finds his activities exposed in the public media and severely criticized, he cannot help but feel that the country neither understands nor appreciates that sacrifice. That is a shame because we are very dedicated to you and to the entire country.

The trauma also extends to the fact that it is more difficult to do our job under these conditions. It has damaged our capability to perform the intelligence functions authorized by law. When we cannot

ensure adequate secrecy, foreigners who are willing to work on our behalf and support our country; foreign governments whose intelligence services complement ours are certainly much less willing to do so.

It has been a traumatic period for the American public also. Americans like to view the world in idealized terms and yet the world is not ideal. It is not open and free. The world is a highly competitive place and more societies than not are closed and totalitarian. Not all countries are willing to tell us what they are going to do in advance, even if their actions may be inimical to our interests. Let me remind you only of the great Soviet wheat steal of 1972 where we simply lacked the statistical data base to drive the proper bargain for our national interests.

Today, if we are to protect those interests and our pocketbooks, we must have good information about what is going on in the rest of the world. It is, in fact, much more important today than ever before.

Thirty years ago, when the Central Intelligence Agency was founded, we were the preeminent military power in the world; we were a totally independent economic power and many if not most of the world's free nations took their political cues from us. How different is today's world. We are one of several interdependent economic powers. We do not dominate the world's political scene. Small nations and large are activist and independent. We are much closer to military parity. In these circumstances, the leverage of good information is much greater than it was in the days of economic, political, and military superiority.

Yet, if we are going to have better intelligence, we also must have at least as much secrecy as we have had in the past and the ability to keep national secrets. There is of course a contradiction between the importance of continued secrecy and the danger of secrecy, as shown by the exposures of the last four years. Secrecy can lead to unidentified power. Power in any form can be abused, but unidentified power has a particular potential for abuse. How then can we provide for good intelligence for our country and yet insure against abuse?

On the one hand we can underreact and simply assume that the relatively limited number of abuses of the past will not be repeated because we are more conscious of the problem today. On the other hand we can overreact and so attempt to control potential abuses that we handcuff and handicap our intelligence effort out of business. Either course would be shortsighted. We need to achieve some balance here. The best way to achieve that balance is to have a system of accountability; accountability to the Legislative Branch of our government, accountability to the Executive Branch, and in addition, accountability to the public. And, we must do this in a way that does not handcuff intelligence capability at the same time.

I would like, briefly, to look with you at how this accountability is being structured in all three of these segments of American society and to try to determine whether there is an adequate basis for the kind of accountability the country needs to be assured the intelligence function is being carried out properly.

First, the public sector. In the past, public oversight, public accountability was impossible. Not enough information was shared with the public. Today that is no longer true. The recent revelations, the public inquiries and investigations, the Freedom of Information Act, have all made the American intelligence community much more accessible to the public than before. In addition, over the past several years we have made a very definite and deliberate effort to be more open. My presence here with you tonight, something that probably would not have taken place as recently as four or five years ago, is an earnest of that effort to keep the public as well informed as we can. Also, we respond to the press more forthrightly than ever before. Clearly, we cannot answer every question, but I assure you that the needle is not stuck in the groove that says, "no comment."

Beyond that, we are publishing more; making more intelligence analyses and estimates available to the public. Obviously we are doing that in those areas where information can be downgraded to unclassified. In that process I hope that we are also helping to protect classified information better. The big problem we have is that there is too much classified information and, because of its quantity, it does not engender the respect that is due. So if we can declassify as much as possible and move it into the public sector, I hope we can garner greater respect for that which remains.

Finally, in the public sector, the free press is a major assist to the public in its effort to hold the American intelligence community

accountable. People like Woodward and Bernstein and others have performed yeoman service in helping the public keep track of governmental activities. There are, however, potential problems here.

When something is made known to the press and consequently to the public, it is automatically revealed to a potential enemies. And, unlike a court of law, the press can find you or me guilty through accusation alone. The power to accuse in the public press or on the airwaves of our country is a profound power and one that is susceptible to as much abuse as any other form of power. This can also give rise to another kind of problem. The press, I hope, never has the full set of facts on any given intelligence subject. That means that any member of the media writing about intelligence activities must always work from an incomplete evidentiary base. It is a very difficult position because they must always draw their conclusions from incomplete information. The danger of misinterpretation or distortion is great.

However, we do have some things in common. One of them is the absolute necessity to protect sources. I know how ardently the press holds to that principle in their case; sometimes I am dismayed when they don't recognize it in ours. Let me cite an example.

A few weeks ago in column three on the front page of a national newspaper there was a story about an impending trial with two officials of the ITT Corporation for perjury before the Congress testifying about ITT activities in Chile. The thrust of the story was how bad it was that the Central Intelligence Agency might frustrate that prosecution

because of their unwillingness to release certain information. Over in the next column was another story about a trial underway in New Jersey in which a man accused of murder claimed that to defend himself properly he needed the notes of a New York Times reporter. That reporter refused to produce those notes. The trial was completed, the reporter went to jail for awhile, but the notes were never provided.

These cases may seem different but they are analogous in that they both stand on the principle of protecting sources of information. And yet, the media does not often recognize the similarity here. I believe it is symptomatic of the fact that throughout our country there is not really an adequate recognition of the legitimacy of some degree of secrecy.

Let me move on to survey the second means by which we are held accountable by the Executive Branch of the government. There are a number of processes ensuring accountability in the Executive Branch, but let me focus just on those revolving around the Presidency.

Today, no President can rely on the doctrine of plausible deniability as we have seen in the past. The President is required personally to sign the authorization for any covert political action. The President is kept informed of all sensitive intelligence activities. And this President has very strongly supported the concept that Congress must be given adequate information to perform its oversight responsibilities,

which I will talk about more in a minute. This attitude is vital to the whole process of accountability.

The President also has the Intelligence Oversight Board composed of three members from outside the government, at the moment former Senator Gore, former Governor Scranton and Mr. Thomas Farmer of Washington, D. C. These three men, appointed by and reporting only to the President, have the sole charge to look into the legality and the propriety of intelligence community activities. Any of our employees, any of you, anyone who believes there is an abuse of the intelligence privilege may report it to them. This Board will look into it and report only to the President as to the validity of the allegation and what should be done about it.

Let me move to the accountability process with the Congress. Some people are skeptical here, feeling that the record of the Congress is no better than that of the President in exercising accountability over intelligence. Yet, let me point out that the Congress is a body elected separately from the President and operating totally separate from the Executive Branch of our government. Being accountable to both of these branches is, I think, a reinforcing assurance. There are two committees in the Congress, one in each chamber dedicated exclusively to the task of overseeing the intelligence process.

In the past, intelligence key members of the Congress and effective oversight was really impossible. Vice President Mondale summed up this

situation in his book on accountability by quoting your eminent Massachusetts senator of the past, Leveret Saltonstall. At one time when he was chairman of the subcommittee to oversee the Central Intelligence Agency, the senator said:

"It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials to speak to us, instead it is our reluctance to seek information and knowledge on subjects which I personally, as a member of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have."

I can assure you that attitude does not prevail in the Congress today.

On top of that, the two committees I have mentioned conform very closely to requirements laid out in a recent book by your own dean, Graham Allison, in stating what he felt were the prerequisites for good Congressional oversight of the intelligence community. Let me tick off a few of the standards that Graham set forth:

- That the committee should stand permanently. It does.
- That they should be specifically concerned with intelligence.

They are.

- That they should receive all relevant information. They do.
- That they should be subject to rotating membership. While this is not yet an established rule, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, last January, stood down from his position to establish this principle and concept and I think it will take hold.

- That they should review and approve the intelligence budget. They do. They are now responsible for the authorization process in the Congress for intelligence.
- And finally, they should propose statutory charters to prescribe our authorities and limitations. This is underway at the moment and hopefully legislation will be enacted by the forthcoming Congress.

Let me just go back to what I said in the beginning about the need for balance. Balance between accountability and an ability to conduct effective intelligence. Have we achieved that balance today? I don't know. I think it is too early to tell. I think it will be several years before we know where we are on that tightrope and, in particular, we must wait until the charters are enacted. But, if we do find the right balance, we will have achieved a revolution in intelligence, for never before in history will any major intelligence activity have been subject to a greater degree of accountability. I believe we are on the right track and that this can work. I would remind you that it will require some understanding and some forbearance. Forbearance, for instance, for having such detailed laws and regulation that we will find ourselves in a straightjacket unable to conduct intelligence activities adequately. And here let me just pause to give you an example of how this can go astray.

When I came to the Central Intelligence Agency there was a regulation prohibiting the establishment of any paid, contractual relationship

with any accredited member of the United States news media. I was only there a few weeks when I received a letter from the American Translators Association. They objected to the firing of a large number of stringers to the news media who were also part-time translators for the open and unclassified Foreign Broadcast Information Service. That really didn't make any sense, so we rewrote the regulation putting in a loophole clause which it said we would not establish any paid contractual relationship with any accredited member of the American news media unless the Director of Central Intelligence personally makes an exception. That may seem to be no regulation whatsoever; that I can make an infinite number of exceptions. I don't think that is the case. I remind you that I am accountable to the oversight process I have just described; I am subject to interrogation by the Intelligence Oversight Board, the President, and by two committees of Congress as to what use I make of this loophole. Unjustified use of it would not be tolerated.

In sum, it is not a perfect world. It is not an open world. It is a world in which we must balance idealism and realism in international affairs. We must be sure that the check of accountability encourages our idealism. We must ensure that the check of accountability is made sufficiently flexible so that idealism can be tempered with realism. We are not there yet, but we are moving strongly in the right direction. It is an exciting period, an important period in American intelligence. A period when we are, in effect, evolving a new, uniquely American model of intelligence, one tailored to the values and standards of our society, and yet, one which is also designed to ensure that we remain what we are today, the number one intelligence service in the world.